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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STA'rE OF UTAH 
= = = = = = = = = = 
s· ... ·;~ 1:1E OP UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Respondent, ) 
) 
VSo ) Case No. 11092 
) 
iff.,l'J;'-JY BRENT CRISCOLA, ) 
) 
Defendant and ) 
Appellant. ) 
= :c:: = = = = = = = 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
= = = = = = = = = 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Danny Brent Criscola appeals 
rro~:1 his conviction for the crime of Burglary in 
the Second Degree in violation of Section 76-9-3, 
i 
I Ute;;--, Code Annotated, 1953, and Grand Larceny in 
viol6tion of Section 76-38-1 and Section 76-38-4, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, upon jury trial in the 
TI1ird Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County 
:c~:;:::c of Utc:ih, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft pre-
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with the crimes of 
3un;lary in tJ1e Second Degree and of Grand Larceny 
i:1 the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
30~t Lake County, State of Utah, on April 20, 1967. 
:~c was arraigned and a plea of not guilty entered. 
~~ial by jury was corrunenced on June 29, 1967, and 
co~cluded on the same day. After presentation of 
~i·e evidence the appellant was found guilty of second 
• C:egree burglary and grand larceny and Judge Bryant 
~. Croft entered judgment on the verdict on June 30, 
:967, sentencing the appellant to an indeterminate 
cerr.1 of one to twenty years on the burglary conviction 
c.:-:- ..-1e to ten years on the grand larceny conviction. 
hppellant was corrunitted to the Utah State Prison on 
! 
I 
July S, 1967. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPF.AL 
The appellant submits that the conviction should 
,~e dismissed, or in the alternative that the conviction 
I ~:-iould be reversed and a new trial granted. 
I -2-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 10:30 p.m. on January 11, 1967, George 
2:,11:;_;1ger, an employee of the Highland Petroleum 
Company, (incorporated as Automotive Safety Service 
i:;-;c., located at 2892 Highland Drive in Salt Lake 
City) closed his business. He testified that he put 
~: 1e cash in the safe, locked and checked the doors 
CLlG :eft the premises about 10:45 p.m. (Tr. 56, 
57, 58). 
At about 2:00 a.m. on January 12, 1967, Michael 
\·J. i-lanks, a Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputy was 
i~ tne vicinity of Zenith Avenue and Highland Drive 
\'..:'r. 79, 80). He saw a car with a lone occupant, 
(who he later ascertained was one Richard Hamilton) 
8 3 ) , 'parked with its motor running, next to 
1 tte 3eefeaters Restaurant located at that intersection 
(~r. 80). He pulled along side the car in his police 
vehicle and asked Hamilton for an explanation of his 
presence. Hamilton replied that he was waiting for 
someone inside the restaurant (Tr. 80). Deputy 
-3-
:·"~."J(S the:! r;iade out a field report on the car, noting 
was a 1957 Ford, license number CJ 1670 (Tr. 81). 
... , ~ .. c::-ning to the area three or four minutes 
c~r he discovered the car was gone (Tr. 80). He 
.. •.::~ co:ltacted the sheriff's dispu.tcher and arranged 
~o >.ave a Salt Lake City patrol car meet him (Tr. 81), 
~~J soon tr.ereafter he met with Officer David M. 
I ~::-::..c.-.:-..01 t of the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
i ~c,,_o nim of tY1e suspicious car, and advised Brienhol t 
' ~c d-.eck the buildings in the area, which were in 
c:i'.c cit:y jurisdiction by about one block (Tr. 82)o 
:J.c::y-.:ty Eanks then parked his car near 33rd South and 
:<::..gl':iland Drive from where he noticed the same car 
:;_:ii;'lg east on 33rd South with three occupants, whom 
~.2 could not identify (Tr. 84). He did not there-
u:ter see the vehicle (Tr. 83). 
Cfficer Brienholt testified that he followed 
•.i~·c: tracks in the newly fallen snow from the area 
;;ccx'c. to the Beefeaters Restaurant to an area on 
~.t.K:ir, Avenue where he saw footprints where someone 
-4-
... :::;')i)Llrently alighted from the car. He followed 
~·~~0 to the front door of the Highland Petroleum 
:o~ .;Jeiny (Tr. 86) • He checked the doors and windows 
.. - ::1c station, but could find no signs of entry or 
·.'1~ doors (Tr. 86). Officer Brienholt testified 
... c.t he could see nothing out of order inside the 
1 oc0::ion and that the night lights were on, but that 
:.e could not see the safe from his position outside 
~:~2 station (Tr. 88, 89). At about this time he 
~ . .) ciced a car fairly closely matching the description 
, :Jc:ty Hanks had given him pulling out of Crandall 
.:.venue on to Highland Drive with three occupants, 
:.o:-,e of which he could identify (Tr. 86, 8 7) • He 
:o~lowed tracks in the snow down Crandall Avenue 
co see if he could ascertain where the car had been, 
:~cting that there were only one set of tracks in 
c;,e new snow on that street. He followed these 
.::-c,c>:s dovm Crandall Avenue to 12th East and found 
c_.:o places where the car had apprently stopped and 
:.;c:;,eone had alighted. From one of these two stopping 
-5-
0ces there were footprints leading up Zenith Avenue 
jo ~;1e back of the station (Tr. 87). He saw no one 
:oot in the area and did not see the car again 
83). 
2Ggene Baker, an employee of Highland Petroleum 
,u brother of the station owner, arrived at the 
stac.=;_on at about 7:05 a.m. on January 12, 1967, to 
2~en the station for business (Tr. 61). He noticed 
Jn entering the station's office that the safe door 
ajar (Tr. 62). He called police, (Tr. 62), 
:i:',C. :-iis brother, the owner, (Tr. 71). He then 
s2o..rc~ed the station for signs of entry and could 
~~r.c none (Tr. 63, 64). After the officers arrived 
:.e took an inventory and found six quarts of 20 
.:'c. Pennzoil motor oil and one Lee oil filter model 
~:;_.,::_, to be missing (Tr. 64). Both items were 
1 c.c;z:-iowledged as being common i terns for sale in many 
=·2c:-vice stations and businesses (Tr. 68) o He 
i_ci,:::ntified the type of oil missing to be the same 
t];)e as the six cans of oil of state's exhibit 
''"" ~er six, and the filter missing to be the same 
-6-
c LIS that of state's exhibit number seven. He 
,,~•,, ;'ot determine the amount of money missing (Tr. 
'"'~ 1. Ee testified that the night lights were still 
, ,, 0.:1<. th3.t t.i1ere was no other damage except that 
~o the safe and to the inside door to the office 
i.:--: \·k;ich the safe was located (Tr. 66). Ronald Baker, 
t:~e ovmer and manager, on his arrival soon after his 
";:i.:_"o ::::-.er' s call, checked to see how much money was 
r.._:_ssi;-ig and found the· amount to be over $200.00 
On the following day, January 13, 1967, Officer 
'2hor.:as w. Brown, of the Salt Lake City Police De-
p2~ bnent saw the appellant driving in a car at about 
Fou.cth South and Second East, followed him, and 
.~3vi:-.g information that his driver's license was 
;~,~;:;er.ded, stopped him at about 360 East 9th South 
\~.co 90, 91). Appellant was driving a 1957 Ford, 
l.,_c(::;--,se number CJ 1670 (Tr. 91). Officer Brown asked 
to see his driver's license and appellant produced 
a mutilated Colorado driver's license. Officer 
-7-
.= L·c\n: i'lsked appellant if he was aware that his 
c'::;.-::..vcr' s license was suspended and appellant stated 
' t;1u. t ti1is was impossible as he had been in Colorado 
, for c.wo years. At that time Officer Brown arrested 
o'.))Cllant for driving with a suspended driver's 
license, handcuffed him, placed h.lln in the police 
c~~, ar.d then called a wrecker and impounded his 
vehicle (Tr. 91). 
Then Officer Brown searched the car before it 
was hauled away, at the scene of the arrest, removing 
fro~ the vehicle six cans of Pennzoil, an oil filter, 
a ~x with some old spark plugs in it and a black 
k;:,::_ t: sweater, (Tr. 91). He placed the cans of oil 
a~c the filter in plastic bags, sealed them and placed 
t:--,err, along with the old spark plugs and sweater in the 
evidence room at the Police Station (Tr. 92). Officer 
Brown testified that there was nothing else in the 
car at the t.llne (Tr. 92). He identified the oil 
and filter as state's exhibits numbers six and 
seven (Tr. 91). 
-8-
3o1mie Cc.mpbell, an acquaintance of the appellant 
~,,;'cificd that at about 4:30 p.m. on January 13, 1967, 
<'i~cllu.nt asked her to take and keep some tools for 
•'-'' ., as he U1ought the police mignt come to his 
:.0~.-.0 \·Jith a warrant looking for them, and he didn't 
.. ::;~-c therr, to be found there (Tr. 95). She further 
ccstified that the tools he gave her appeared to 
I ~e: t=i.ose comprising state's exhibits eight and nine 
(~~. 98). She took them and placed them under a 
'';jec. ir, her ap2xtment (Tr. 95). 
Susan Johnson Hand, a roommate of Miss Campbell, 
testified that she saw the tools under the bed near 
e~d of January (Tr. 100, 101). 
Helga Landau, another roommate, testified that 
s;;e: also saw the tools under the bed (Tr. 102), 
c.nC. -c:10. t about 7 : 3 0 or 8 : 00 p .m. on February 23, 
( ~0G7, appellant and another man, unknown to her, 
:::c~:.e to the apartment, the appellant saying that 
.-.• c > .. ,d coiT.e to get his tools, whereupon the appellant 
'"';'"' "riis campanion went into the bedroom and left 
c;-,,c- C.~)artment shortly. thereafter carrying a bundle 
-9-
~:J~, 103). Paul Wright was also present at 
•~ ~:;_s ·c._;_:··1'2 and his testimony was substantially the 
~·:i~ .. c as i"iiss Landau's except that he saw the appel-
ca;:rying a sledge hanuner from the apartment 
·, 
':'>,e companion of appellant at the time the tools 
\·.·ere rerr,oved from the apartment, Michael Heidrich, 
tes~ified that appellant took a crowbar and sledge 
.:::.~.u-:~er from under the bed, then Heidrich went out 
to -.:he car and fell asleep, not seeing the appellant 
;:::l.ace the tools in the car (Tr. 118, 119). 
On the following day, February 24, 1967, Officer 
Cu.y ~·J. Blunk of the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
responded to a call from a fellow officer. The 
lc:..tter having announced that he had stopped a vio-
lc:.. tor. When Officer BlW1k arrived on the scene 
;::;-;e other officer informed him that he was going to 
~rrest ~~e appellant for a traffic violation, and 
co~~g so, placed appellant in the other officer's 
po~~ce car, requesting Officer Blunk to maintain 
-10-
: - .:;.:; c~-·C"Vrol0t s tc:ct::..on WCl<JOn registered to Viichael 
'I'he other 
scene 11:1--c:n che appellant in 
o.nd rer~,oved a tool chest, 
~-.-=2;,-,.::; \-,,;ith r .. ota-Cior.is of the tirae, Gate, place and 
~.~s ::_..",i tic.ls; p:c.ced b1em in his police car, and 
c_:csi~ed t~e~ in the police evidence room on his 
ac -c..-.e pol:i.ce s'cc:tion ('.L'r. 109) o He test-
c~ cross-exar:lination that the sledge hammer 
crcwbar were not in plain sight, but were on 
vehicle partially under the seat 
ccvered with the coat ('=1r. 110). 
C~~:c::cer Dave Bradford, of the Salt Lake City 
~.:,::_ice I!2partrr,2~1t testified that he investigated the 
::_20) and exo:nined the general premises and the 
Ge tes~ified that he could find no point 
-11-
:?.B.I., 
by Officer 3radford, and the 
___ v _,__;o.r, c..1-.C: a_s a res~-=-- t of -G"lis exarnination was 
.'~--u., ~•·G'- -:.-:e: pc:._i::-.t deposit on the crowbar 
2::._ -:.12r -;:ro.--:-, -c,-;e su;~,e sou.cce a_s the paint samples 
__ -.2 .-.::._s-:-:~c.::_c ?etrole-c1m Company or another 
- -..L ... .:.. a. s~miliar hlorti1er with the same 
(r;:·r~ ::__29), :Out::._;-, l-:is opinion the possibility 
la~ter ~as remote :;_30). 
:; S~~._:, _ _:,c::;___~.::Jr S:'.:IZJ.::CS OF A Ci=<OWBl,R AND SLEDGE 
.-.:,;_:_:__ . . C::G_-; :.'.-.S =:L:;:,;:;c;,:,L U~;JZR '1.'H2 CONSTITUTION 
-12-
-~~ ~-2 cailse, ?~eston Vw United States, 376 U.s: 
case do not come 
<:>,ere:Oy obtained should have been ex-
,-... . - _. - ,..-
\........1.._ ........ ..___-...:.1..-. w I-'i'S')Y) v c:1in, 367 U.S. 643, (1961). 
r::·~~,e stat2 ap~aren-C.ly makes no claim that it 
~~o~~~:e cause to stop appellant's car and search 
:: :::,;:- -:.-.e i ti~ .. 2s seized, ::..ns tead, appellant was 
-~ ~c._-,_-::;ec fo.c a -c:rG.ffic violation, arrested, the car 
-:=:-.e circt:.T,s-C.a:;ces here clearly do not justify 
s --::~ . .:-en a:-lG seizure of toe crowbar and sledge 
-13-
3S Appellant 
: .. _-:_-cs ceci. for a t-caffic violation, placed in one 
_: ~ ic---:~ · s car, c.:-"d while ot1 l--:is way, or possibly 
'·~ a:rived the police station, the second 
L - _-::._c,-~;: sc::.rted tl12 search of appellant's car which 
c.:, -c:-.e seizure of evidence of a crirr,e unrelated 
arres-c was made (Tr. 108, 
- ~-.. \ 
_._, ~') ... ':.:'::--.e j L~s Cifica tions for a search incident to 
• 2.s \.·as stated in ?res ton v ff United States. 
367: 
'-:J:i~estionally 1 wl;en a person is lc.wfully 
CC'.'res~ed, the police hc.ve the right, without a 
se..:.rch warrc:mt, to make a conter<,·-:ioraneous 
c~ ::or 
of the person of 
t>ie frui'cs of or 
crirae" 
D.1e c.ccused for weapons 
imple~ents used to 
right to search and 
:::eize wi'cho-u.c a search warrant extends to things 
_:-r.::':'c'.:c ':_>2 c,ccuse_::i 1 s i_lVnediate control, and, 
co CI1 e::,.;:-ce::r:t depc.1dir.g on tne circumstances 
of the case, to the place where he is arrestedo 
:-S-=--£::;=-:-~ _ _'.':'._l~_0' ~-'G contemporaneous searches 
_ _'.~_':·~~_ti:=i~c::i _..fo'-:.__~xc:m0le, :!Jv the need to seize 
· ~<--= c 2_:n,d otl-·cr -cicinc:s which mic:ht :Je used 
3} __ ~cos 'C-c:,==--c n -~ off:i_cer or effect. an escape, as 
1 ,,-: ~~ 2s ::-.i'' tf-e cced to -::irevent destruction of 
,,-,:: -.:.:~~cf ~c:r,e c:-irr.2--things whici1 might 
c~s~ly ha~pc~ where the weapon or evidence 
i~ c~ ~he accu:::e0 1 s person or t.;nder his irrunediate 
-14-
I :_,~1ce i_:corll 
---·---->"• ------·-~· 
-~::.__---~---- __ -,_~ __ ~:__.\_\,~(~:.L~-~~-------~c__,._ is s J-J~:1J_l~y_1_-._o_-_:___i_· _r.._c_i_· _d_e_:i_, __ -;--__ 
______ c_--_-_ .. _. " \ .=:npi10sis aC::C:Ceci.. ) 
• ""----'°~'-"-' :..r1 tr.e :? 0eston case were str-ikingly 
seurci1 of the appellant's car, 
In Preston 
3cc11sed were arrested ~J state officers for 
\·.· ~--:..---!~ t:c..ke;1 ir.to custody, and their car searched 
'::.\1e evidence seized at that time 
-~sed against L.r .. e::. on a c:r1c..rge unrelated to trie 
T~e court concluded that since 
.:.c...:..rct: was •''-'~ inciderY!:. to arrest and without 
~-...:- ...:-:::;;-.:: J..-c :::'aiJ.eC. to meet the Foucth Arnendment 
..::-e.--:.cerir-.g the evidence inadmissible. 
the search of a;ipellant's car is claimed to 
• ·. _ ...:,:.er. me.de L-:..c:::.dent to impm.md 7 rather than 
. .::::.~--=.;-.t c:o arrest, the qc.;.estio:::--1 then arises as to 
exception to the warrant 
-15-
Cali::'orni2, 386 
• , I - (I~ r-7' 
_,v \..l...JU i 1 .. ,
officers arrested defendar,t 
a rr! "'~ 
Th8 Supreme Court 
- ':._s searc:1 legal on -the ground that the impound-
-CC'--·-· ~'---' -::.rans)ort narcotics should be held, as evidence, 
2 ~orfei'cure was declared or a release ordered. 
~- "J __ o ::_ c'.ing ·c:--.e sear ch, U1e court distinguished 
v, L:::-1i ~=C: Scc;·tes, supra, where no such statute 
'· • -Che reaso~1 -for the nature of the custody 
~- -=..; c~_si:itvc:ionally justify the search. Preston 
\<'C.S arrested for vagrancy. An arresting officer 
-coo;-c "nis car to U1e station rather than just 
::.2avi~g it en the street. It was not suggested 
-c;~"::.t ~-:is was done ot>.er than for Pres ton's 
cor-.veni21xe or tha-i: -che police had aI1y right 
c:.o L:.po-~'lci the co.r anc-, kee) it from ::?reston or 
,_.,~--;.cmc::ver :--ce I1ti<:::,:1t senC: :for ito The fact that 
-c,,e police had cus-tody of Preston's car was 
totally w.re::_c.ted to the vagrancy charge for 
'--~--:icri t::-cy v.2:_c:e arrested. So was the subsequent 
sc~c:-1 o-Z _ the car.. '.L':1is case (Cooper) was 
:-.o-t .?re.ston, r.or is ic:. controlled by it. 
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' - L 
-·~-~~--__ __ ,___·:.-__,._::_~, _ ,n~:_~~ _::.-·?~c L-.j_r(~(~ ~(- s·C2tf__: "j_r-i:}_u 
\'r s--=~~LZCLc i-c 02co-use o:C L.l--:.e c.:ciITLe for ;J~i.ich 
'---- 1~y ,::-~r.L-c.s-ced p2ti .'.-=.ior1er ~ rr>J_2y seized it to 
:~,,.,:)O'L;~1c1 :~t G·.-.d chey huCi to kee) it ur1til for-
=:_=c;.i_·CL·_:_-c :=;J:-oce:c>__.~ " .. gs \Vere col1.c:~dec1-A Tl-:ej_r 
:=:·.;:.~.:;,:::c:,c.:.er.'c ::::: ... ·ch of the car--•.v:-ietner tt-.e state 
· -l ; :-...ecj;:i:;_ ::::_Cl\.::' -~~o it or r,o c--was closely 
-.~~._:J1:ec -~~n \-,-,,-. cc.~Lsor1 f· 1~··=·i_tior1e.c 1.1as arrested, 
L· -~ rec.;.;o, 1 \1is cc...c ha Ci been impounded, and the 
"~2c.soy1 i_·c was beirn; retai;:iedo" Cooper v. Cal-
• ·"' - '."'."i."' supra at 61 (Emphasis added. ) 
·che Cooper exception. T:r1e search 
:.2~2 \·:c..s ::-.ot ;::-elatec ·co the reason appellant was 
~~~ested: or to tl'1e reason the car was impounded 1 
to ~he rec.so~ tne car was being retained. The 
·c>,at the police had custody of appellant's 
L - ,;:.s c.:.rirelc..·ced to 'che traffic violation he was 
·--~~..:;·cec. for, exceLJt insofar as the arrest caused 
.. :....:. ~o :..nvollli1ta.rily 11 abandon" his car on a public 
s .:.~ee·c~ T:1ere is no suggestion that arrest for a 
~.cc..::::'::Eic viclatio.n subjects the violator's car to 
~v~::Eeiture, or that state law specifically requires 
the impounding of appellant's 
:-.2.r-e was of t11e "ca.r-etaking" type and does not 
·-~~~:;:y ·u....-ide.c tne special exception of Coooer. 
-17-
·'~ ..::,i:1 ;ilain sight cccorci.ix19 to tL2 testimony of the 
c - -_ce::: \Jl-'10 made the .:;e::..."ci', but were slid partially 
~-·~·'--" ..:.~2 seat 0 .. c, covered with a coat (Tr. 110). 
~· 2'' ..:'.~us cc.:-.lco·c be legally seized under the rationale 
---~.s v., Un"_tec States, 370 F. 2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 
'..''.~i_ch lJermi·..:ted evidence readily seen while the 
.Jc·-..:.:-.C.ir.c; o::fficer was rolling up windows of the 
.c ...:.:".C.ed vehicle in a "caretaking" type impound 
A sledge hammer is not 
_ -=...:.:::·;lex -cool as defined under Section 76-9-82, 
v.:.~~ CoC.e Anr..O'Cated, 1953, nor was there any facts 
w> . .::.ch it cou::.c. :Oe concluded that appellant's 
_-c:::session of -che crow~ar and sledge hammer were for 
::: .:._c.'1io·u.s purposes o 
'::'i-.2 general searcn of ar, automobile incident 
c ~~affic arrest has generally been held improper. 
0~~ Seizace Incident to Traffic Violations, 
.. _::..lia.11.ette Law Journal 247 (1967). 
:=n the Ut1:l_ted States ex rc:l Kroc;ness v. Gladden, 
., 
~ . ~99 (D.C. Ore. 1965), United States 
-18-
,:;::_s CL'ict Cou.::-~ :Cor the District of Oregon granted 
'" c:. cio:ie_c u writ of habeas corpus under cir-
'-- =.·;:c;;--,ces co:T,!:Xlrable to those in the instant case. 
~··~' ~::,2c.itioner Has arrested for a traffic violation 
- ~(j c:<e C'lG'.'estin<J officer reCO<JDized him as having 
0 :o:~ce record. Subsequently, other officers arrived 
see:-.:: 
c:.:-.c. '.Jec.;ions were seized which were linked to a bur-
c;=.c.::y whicr, Has previously cormni tted. The Oregon 
has previously affirmed the conviction 
·c::,e grou;-.ds that the officers had reasonable 
cc.·c:s2 L:O believe 'che car was carrying contraband, 
'.:'.',3 O::e. 135, 388 P. 2d 120 (1964). The federal 
cc.-~:: hm1ever, 9ranted the writ finding no relation-
;::,2tween the arrest and the search. 
:=...1 ·che instant case there is no evidence to 
s~;;ort a determination that the officer had any 
::_ ·.::c.c:.-,ation when he stopped the vehicle for the 
c.::c.ff:i.c violation that it contained any contraband. 
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.'c ··:::.::0r, the i cems seized were not contraband, but 
.. · ~ ~::..:' ;=iossib~c evidence. The Federal Court in 
·,·,· ·e:s no<=eec cnat the search of the vehicle 
,·,::s ;:: · t relac:ed to the traffic violation, but was 
·"' ,:::·...:..:.·cly exploratory seizure wi>ich was u..'1.reason-
.~ c~::d w:i.thout probc:'ble cause." Many courts have 
~ _ :::.::c.t a s.::c: :c::: exp=.orator~r in r.ature accompanied 
.: · -=-:;~ a::rest for traffic offenses is unlawful. 
"-=~=c:·:s \T. un:L·=ed States, 289 F. 2d 129 (Sill Cir. 
1%2.);; 2'2'1.1<:i::.s v, State, 232 Md. 529, 194 Atl. 2d 
SlS (l9S3); 3ro~m v State, 358 s.w. 2d 388 (Tex. 
C:.::'...~,ir.c.::. !.pp. 1962 ) • See al so Simeone, Search and 
~e:z-.·~e Inci.ceCJ.t to Traffic Violations, 6 St. Louis 
c,..,iversi'.::y Law Journal 506 (1961); note Search and 
S-::2.ze,:re Incident to Traffic ViolatioY'ls, 1959 Wis. 
~. Rev. 347; Tiffany, Mcintyre & Rotenberg, Detection 
c~ Cri.'"'.'e, (1967) pp. 132-133. Consequently in this 
:..:.:::·::;c.:1ce w}<ere the arrest of the appellant was wholly 
·~·...::-e:::..o.ted to any need to search the vehicle it is 
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c):..wious that t:-,::_s search cannot be sustained. The 
0iJ)ellan-c was already in custody and away from the 
sc12;1e w T!1ere was no need for searching the vehicle 
for ~~e protection of the officer. Second, there 
'-' . .:.-::; :-.o indicat::.o;-1 the vehicle contained contraband. 
-.:!-,ere \-.-as no basis to search for evidence 
::_:-iStnlJT,entalities by which the crime for which 
~,))ellant was arrested was committed. Absent 
.:;.ese essentials there was no basis on which the 
search could be justified. 
Recently this court in State v. Chestnut, # 10638 
Fejruary 6, 1968, sustained a search incident to an 
-:_.~-..::-e:st even though it appeared to be a traffic arrest • 
. -_.: , 2-.-e:r i this case is clearly distinguishable from 
~ .. .: ::"acts of the ins tar. t case s :i.nce it involved an 
of driving under .::-.,-' i:-.fluence of intoxicating 
and a search was made ::_n the presence of the 
c~:~~dants. A search of a vehicle after the arrest 
0:: a )erson for operating the vehicle under the 
_:_:-.:.:'h.:ence of intoxicating liquor can be justified 
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~ ~ c).:oper search for liquor or empty bottles from 
v .. ~.::._ch t.t'le intoxicant may have been consumed. There-
::'"ore, the Ches tn1 i- case .::._. readily distinguished 
:rom the ir~tant case. 
Appellant, therefore, submits that the facts 
-o~ thi~ case do not qualify under the special ex-
ce:.=i-:::io:-. of C;;~~' that the search was not incident 
cev::..c2 ·:::o per::,::._ t a general search to seize evidence 
for ~.-.a-cching purposes in an attempt to connect o.;:;?e~-
le.:-.-::: wi.-ch tr,e crime. The traffic arrest bei:lc; a 
~estrai~t to artifice to search appellant's car, 
.:~·.2;..·e :Oeing no evidence sufficient to obtain a 
\,•c.::-~·c.::i:. Appellant further contends therefore, that 
c.s i:: ?reston, the search and seizure was illegal 
::::-_C. t:-:.e evidence gained thereby should have been 
exc:~ -..;.C.ed, Mapp v, c· ~-o, supra. 
?urther, even if the search could be justified, 
,:;eizure of the i·:::ems could not. A crowbar and 
sleC:.c;e hammer are not contraband. 'I',1eir possession 
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i.3 ;-:ot per se illegal. The officer had no information 
1/,1.ich would connect these items to a crime except 
speculationo Consequently, the seizure of these 
ite;,1s was itself illegal. It is well recognized 
chat even though there may be legal justification 
~or a search and seizure of items absent showing that 
the ite:-ns seized are contraband or that there is 
probable cause to believe that they were connected 
-.- :: c_-il<',e the seizure of the evidence 
i cannoc: be justified. In Davis, Federal Searches 
' 2nd Seizure, it is stated with reference to ~he 
seizure of items: 
"For convenience of reference, this list may 
be shortened to: (1) Means and instruments 
of co~~itting a criminal offense, (2) Fruits 
of crime, (3) Weapons of escape, and, (4) 
Contraband. 
"In order to be legallv seizable, property 
must f2ll within one of the categories listed 
a::::>ove. This is true even though the search 
a..1d seizure is legally justified and lawfully 
conducted. Of course, once articles are legally 
seized, they must be offered as evidence to 
prove criminal charges." (Emphasis added.) 
Failure of the trial court to exclude the il-
iegally obtained evidence was not harmless error. 
-23-
.-.s co the standard for harmless error the United 
::>-;;ates Supreme Court has held it to be 11 ••• 
\·1::ether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to 
t.1e co:---.viction." Fahy Vo Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 
00, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171, 84 S. Cto 229 (1963). Clearly 
wit;1out the illegally seized evidence the conviction 
of the appellant could not have occurred. 
Appellant recognizes that the search and seizure 
:-.ere co::-.;::ilained of was not objected to at trial, 
.:ic:t contends that this court must nonetheless con-
sider the issue on the merits. In Henery v. Mississ-
~' 379 U.S. 443, (1965), the United States Supreme 
Court held that state procedural requirements could 
r.ot defeat the petitioner's federal constitutional 
rights unless it could be determined that, 11 • o • 
c=ter consultations with competent counsel or other-
·.;ise (the petitioner) understandingly and knowingly 
fo.cewent the privilege of seeking to vindicate his 
federal claims in the state courts, whether for 
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strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can 
~e ~airly described as deliberate by-passing of state 
procedures." (Emphasis added• ) 
~bre recently in Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 
1, Cl966), the court held that "(T)he question of 
c. waiver of a federally guaranteed constitutional 
right is, of course, a federal question to be controlled 
by federal law. There is a presumption against the 
waiver of constitutional rights ••• and for a 
waiver to be effective it must be clearly established 
that tnere was an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant's contention here that there was no 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right at trial is borne out by the record which 
discloses no knowledge by the appellant of a privilege 
or right to object to the illegal search and seizure, 
as the federal claims were never raised at trialo 
Tims, certainly there was no knowing and understanding 
waiver or intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of his federal claims. 
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'.::'he Supreme Court in Henery v. Mississippi, 
su~ra, notes friction between state and federal 
cm.:rts arising out of federal habeas corpus and again 
as ::_ t did in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, (1963), 
c.;-.c extended to t.'!e state courts an invitation to 
']:'._Ve _:-,;11 attention to federal claims in state courts, 
~i--.us :-r.inimizing the need for federal habeas corpus 
and the resultant friction. 
Appellant submits the failure to object cannot 
~recluoe consideration of the issue. 
POIJ\J'T II 
r;:'HE JURY INSTRUCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT AS 
i 'l'J LARCENY WAS WHOLLY INADEQUATE, OMITTING THE 
SSSENTIAL ELEi"1ENTS OF THAT OFFENSE, AND SHOWED 
?LAIN AND PALPABLE ERROR ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD 
TO TP.E ~JANIFEST DETRIMENT OF APPELLANT. 
Appellant contends the instruction given to 
foe jury as to Grand Larceny (Instruction No. 15, 
Tr. 39) is wholly inadequate in that it omits what 
is generally the essential elements of the crime. 
The trial court's instruction stated as the essential 
elements of the crime of grand larceny as follows: 
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"l. That on or about the 12th day of January, 
1967, the defendant, Danny Brent Criscola, 
stole personal property of Automotive Safety 
Service Incorporated. 
"2. That such stealing was felonious. 
"3. That said personal property had value in 
excess of $50.00 when so stolen. 
:- That said acts occurred in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. " (Tr. 3 9 ) • 
Generally the essential elements of the crime 
are cor~idered to be; first, that the taking or 
carrying away was without the owner's consent or 
:rnoi:Jl edge; second, that the taking was done with the 
intention to permanently appropriate such property 
to the taker's use; and third, that the taker intended 
to permanently deprive the owner of possession of 
the property. Clark and Marshall, Crimes, p. 825 
(7~ Ed. 1962); A. E. Bronson, The Law of Instructions 
to Juries § 3916 (3rd Ed. 1962). 
The instruction gave only general advice that 
fr,e jury must find that the "stealing was felonious" 
which in addition to omitting the essential elements 
of the offense, would be practically devoid of 
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r112~;ning to a jury without further explanation. As 
stated by this court on the sufficiency of a larceny 
instruction: 
"· •• defendant urged that the court erred 
in instructing the jury that 'if the defendant 
was an inmate of the penitentiary at the time 
of the larceny, serving out a sentence of a 
competent court, and that he took the horse 
in question for the purpose of escaping, that 
would be larcenyo' This charae, taken by itself, 
und disconnected from that which followed, might 
be subject to the objection made; but we find 
the court charqed the jury correctly in defining 
larceny; and also charged the jw:y that before 
they could convict, 'they must find, beyond 
reasonable doubt, that the defendant feloniously 
took and rode away the horse in question, with 
~nt to deprive the owner thereof of the~ 
oHnershiD and use of the horse; and that there 
ouqht to be a union of act and intent in every 
criminal offense. That the taking must have 
been without any intent of returning the same,' 
etc. Taking ._the charge as given, as a whole, 
we find no error in the instructions given." 
People v. Flynn, 7 Utah 378 at 379., 26 P. 1114 
(1891). (Emphasis added.) 
The instruction given by the court as to larceny 
in appellant's trial seems to be plainly insufficient 
by the standards of this court and the generally 
accepted standards of legal authority. 
It appears from the record that no exception 
was taken to the instruction here complained of at 
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trial, but that has been held not to bar this court's 
consideration of claims of error when there is plain 
. 
0nd palpable error on the face of the record in 
instructions given or refused. State v. Cobo, 90 
Utah 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936); State v. Waid, 92 Utah 
297, 67 P. 2d 647 (1937). The instruction given 
in this case was totally devoid of any explanation 
of the elements of the offense, and completely 
inadequate. Therefore, the appellant's conviction 
for grand larceny should be reversed. 
POINT III 
ThE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE APPELLANT WAS DRIVING 
ATrn THE SUBSEQUENT SEIZURE OF THE OJL AND OIL FJLTER 
THEREFROM WERE ILLEGAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
The search complained of here was more nearly 
like the traditionally allowed search incident to 
arrest than the search which yielded the crowbar 
and sledge hanuner as appellant was present at the 
time of this search. However, the circumstances 
surrounding the search here complained of do not 
provide the common justifications for search incident 
to arrest set out in Preston v. United States, supra, 
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as a~)pellant was handcuffed and sitting in the arresting 
o:ficer's patrol car (Tr. 91), at the time the search 
wCJ.s carried out, and was in no sense in "immediate 
control" of the vehicle being searched, posed no 
danger to the safety of the officer or to the pre-
servation of any evidence. Further, under Preston, 
the seizure of fruits and instrumentalities is 
limi~ed to those of the crime for which the arrest 
is made or contraband. The items seized were in 
no way "fruits or instrumentalities" of the traffic 
offense for which appellant was arrested nor known 
coutraband at the time seized. 
Appellant further submits that the search was, 
by itself, unreasonable as it was made by the util-
ization of a sham arrest, the arrest beJ.9g used as 
a pretext in an attempt to overcome his Fourth Amend-
rr:ent right of privacy in the absence of probable 
cause. 
It is apparent from the record that the police 
were without probable cause to search as they found 
it necessary to resort to the artifice of arresting 
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3p~ellant for a traffic offense in order to accom-
plish the search. 
The fact that the arrest was made the day after 
the perpetuation of the crime for which appellant 
was eventually convicted, the fact that appellant 
was arrested on that day for a continuing type of 
offense (driving on a suspended license), and the fact 
that t.~e same device was used twice in appellant's 
case, both times producing evidence tending to 
connect him with the same unrelated offense, provides 
an irrebutable inference that this arrest was no 
happy coincidence for the police resulting from 
ro~tine traffic enforcement, but was indeed used as 
a pretext to achieve the end of searching appellant's 
vehicle. 
-
A search cannot be justified retroactively by 
what it turns upo State v. Hoover, 219 Ore. 288 9 
347 Po 2d 69 (1959)0 
The cans of oil and oil filter seized were in-
occuous common items of independent brand, which could 
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be found for public sale at many establishments. 
They were not contraband per se. 
"An arrest may not be used as a pretext to 
search for evidence." Search and seizures made incident 
to such arrests may be held violative of Fourth 
Amendment rights. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 
u.s. 452, 467 (1932). 
"Even if (the) arrest were legal, it would not 
legalize the seizure of evidence found • • • since 
the arrest was incident to the seizure and not the 
seizure incident to the arrest. Means are incident 
to ends, not ends to means. It is settled law that 
when it appears ••• that the search and not the 
arrest for the real object of the officers ••• and 
that the arrest was a pretext for, or at the most 
an incident of the search. The search is not rea-
sonable within the meaning of the constitution." 
McKnioht v. United States, 183 F. 2d 977, 979, 978 
(U.s.c.A. D.C. 1950). 
"Instead of the search being incidental to the 
arrest ••• the arrest was incidental to if not 
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0 mere pretext for the search. The question is 
whether a search made under such circumstances vio-
1 ates the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
\'IC think it does." Henderson v. United States, 
12 F. 2d 528 (4~ Cir. 1926). 
Several state courts have spoken out specifically 
against the practice of using traffic violation 
arrest as pretexts for search and seizure. "Where 
the primary purpose of an arrest appears to have 
~een a pretext for making an unrelated, exploratory 
search of the defendant, or his car, the search is 
not justified." Riddlehoover v. State, 198 So. 2d 
651 (D.C.A. Fla. 1967)0 The Michigan Court concerning 
arrests for traffic violations held that " ••• a 
search, if othel:'\</ise illegal because it is made with-
out probable cause is not rendered lawful by • • • (an) 
arrest." People v. Zeigler, 353 Mich. 355, 100 N.W. 
Zil. 456 (1960). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that, 
" •• o it has been made clear that courts will not 
sanction a 'pretended' arrest where a police officer 
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being suspicious of some particular individual, 
observes him until a time when he can be arrested 
on some traffic violation and then under the hoped 
for protection of the arrest searches in an attempt 
to find something incriminating, which will lead to 
a charge having nothing to do with the original 
arrest." Whitleg v. State, 418 P. 2d 164 (Wyoo 1966). 
The recent holding by this court in State Vo 
Chestnut, supra, can be distinguished here also as 
it deals with an arrest for driving under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor which is widely recognized as 
a justifing means for searching for evidence of the 
offense, that being one of the few traffic offenses 
which will reasonably justify a search for tangible 
evidence in.side the car. State v. Taft, 110 S.E. 2d 
727 (W. Va. 1959); State v. Giles, 119 S.E. 2d 394 
(N.C. 1961); State v. Howard, 23 S.W. 2d 10 (Mo. 
1929); State v. Padgett, 316 Mo. 179, 289 S.W. 954 
(1926). 
As to any claim that the oil and oil filter 
were validly seized incident to impound, the same 
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authorities which applied in Point I are applicable 
here, and appellant submits they are despositive 
of that ground. 
The search and seizure thus being violative of 
appellant's Fourth Amendment rights they should have 
been excluded at trial. Mapp v. Ohio, supra. 
As to appellant's failure to object to the 
introduction of the illegally seized evidence at 
trial on the above grounds, again these are no in-
dication of a knowing, intentional relinquishment of 
these constitutional guarantees by appellant, and , 
this court should determine the issue on the merits. 
The protective policy of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed to the protection of personal privacy. 
That aim is easy to overcome by sham arrests used 
as pretexts for general exploratory searches, based 
on suspicion, seeking evidence to link one to an 
w-rrelated crimeo Traffic arrests are an ideal medium 
to accomplish these ends because of their broad scope 
and the fact that they can be very technically applied 
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'/ c.:-,ose desirous of effecting and arrest as a means 
Oi_ 3ccomplishing an ulterior end. To allow the 
L:i_~,-o_._:.: ::._c arrest to be thus used is to.drive a hugh 
,J._>-::c:;e into the Fourth Amendment's protected area 0 
::::or.1e 1 a ti tu de must be given, and some exceptions made, 
c...o ~:-;. "'.:he dnmk driving area, from the practical 
c:--,::'orce:c,ent standpoint, but the circumstances 
'.-;.er2 show blantant abuse of the device, and appellant's 
co~viction should not be allowed to stand. 
CONCI..USION 
Appellant submits that the burglary conviction 
s~ould be reversed, as the two searches and seizures 
vx°:re illegal and evidence essential to his conviction 
wc,s obtained thereby and should have been excluded. 
Ee rurther submits that if either or both of the 
searches and seizures is determined to have been 
i~:egal the same result should follow. 
Appellant submits that should this court fail 
to find the searches and seizures illegal, the 
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co~.viction for grand larceny should still be reversed 
bcc3use of the plain and palpable error in the 
grand larceny instruction by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
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